Flying blind: How the EPA let a key chemical-detection program unravel
As toxic emergencies rise, an EPA plane used to identify dangerous chemicals in the air can no longer do its job.
The Smitty’s Supply fire burns in Roseland, La., in August 2025. Miles away, one resident said it was “raining oil.” The EPA declared the air safe, but a former ASPECT scientist later detected toxic chemicals the agency had missed. (Rob Lehman / Air One Drones)
This story is from Floodlight and is published in partnership with WIRED and The Guardian
When an ammonia leak outside a hotel in Weatherford, Okla., injured 74 people last November, the federal government's chemical-detection plane stayed on the ground.
When a fire tore through a Valero refinery in Port Arthur, Texas, in March, the plane sat idle.
And when massive blasts killed two workers at an industrial recycling plant in Toledo, Ohio, in August, it stayed put, despite a fire surrounding tanks of flammable solvents.
“Ten years ago, it would have gone to all of them,” said Mark Thomas, a former EPA official who for years managed the airborne detection effort.
The program, known as ASPECT, was designed to respond around the clock to emergencies involving toxic chemicals, oil spills and radiation. The plane’s sensors could identify chemicals in the air within minutes, giving emergency responders crucial information about the dangers nearby communities face.

For more than two decades, the plane has flown over many of the country’s worst disasters, from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to the deadly West Fertilizer explosion in Texas to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
But since early 2021, the single-engine Cessna has responded to just seven emergencies. And former ASPECT scientists said two of those missions — the 2023 train derailment that sent toxic clouds over East Palestine, Ohio, and the 2025 fire at Smitty’s Supply in Louisiana — were badly mismanaged.
At Smitty’s, the EPA declared the air safe, but a former ASPECT scientist later found toxic chemicals the agency had missed. And the agency’s Inspector General is now auditing the response to the East Palestine derailment, including the data behind its public assurances about air quality.
Now — at a time when chemical emergencies are increasing — the plane can no longer do its job. In June, the EPA Inspector General found the plane’s systems can’t identify chemicals within minutes, as designed. Instead the process takes about a week, far too long to help anyone on the ground who’s deciding whether to evacuate.
The EPA said the plane's chemical sensors are wearing out and expects replacements to be working by mid-2027.
But five people who helped build and run the program told Floodlight that the EPA is fixing the wrong problem.
The old sensors still work, they said. What the agency lost, in their view, is the initiative and expertise that made the program a powerful tool when disaster struck. Replacing the old sensors, they warn, could leave the EPA even less capable of detecting hazardous chemicals in an emergency.

“I fear that the public is at risk,” said Robert Kroutil, a longtime ASPECT scientist who helped develop the program and later became a whistleblower. “It’s such an important program, and they've allowed it to waste away to nothing.”
The EPA did not respond to Floodlight’s requests for an interview or questions about ASPECT’s decline, its handling of emergencies, the replacement of its sensors and allegations of mismanagement by former program scientists and managers.
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A promising start
The country’s need for a chemical-sensing plane grew from the smoldering, toxic debris in Manhattan on Sept. 11, 2001, when the EPA’s monitoring trucks were stranded on the wrong side of the Hudson River, unable to cross after bridges and tunnels into the city closed.
Kroutil was a program manager for the Department of Defense at the time, leading a research team that had developed the technology that would become ASPECT, short for Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology. The military transferred the program to the EPA for use in detecting hazardous chemicals during civilian emergencies.
It became a critical tool for emergency responders over the next 20 years.

For 72 hours after Hurricane Katrina struck, it was the only emergency response aircraft flying over New Orleans, where it helped locate a missing 55-gallon drum of potentially lethal chloroacetic acid.
During the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it became a key tool for tracking oil slicks in the Gulf of Mexico.
And when a fire engulfed 15 massive tanks at a chemical storage terminal east of Houston in 2019, the ASPECT plane helped emergency responders track the plume, which contained the carcinogen benzene.
Richard Lawhorn, an assistant chief with Harris County’s hazardous materials response team in Texas, said the plane could detect chemicals at elevations beyond the reach of ground crews and survey a much wider area in a short time.
“They’re monitoring the products we can’t reach,” he said.
The program’s success lay in its intellectual rigor: Kroutil and the program’s radiological lead held PhDs, as did Mark Thomas, the former EPA official. The team wrote the code, designed the mounts that held gear, and analyzed the raw data themselves.
“We were very, very hands-on and intimately familiar with every part of that aircraft,” said Thomas, who later went to work for a company that develops chemical-sensing technology.
“I think that's changed now.”
How the program lost its way
The decline began with the departures of key ASPECT personnel during President Donald Trump’s first administration.
As part of an agency reorganization, the EPA told the program’s staff in 2019 that they had to relocate to Texas, where the plane was based, or face termination, documents show.
The mandate was unnecessary, according to Thomas, because the program had been designed for remote operation. Rather than leave his elderly parents in Kansas, he retired. Then, ASPECT’s radiological lead left the division, and the engineer who helped build and manage the plane’s sensors accepted a demotion to stay in Kansas.

According to Kroutil and two of his former colleagues, the EPA then failed to fill those vacancies with scientists who had any experience with airborne chemical detection.
“They lost the institutional knowledge of the program, and quite frankly, lost the momentum of the program,” Thomas said.
During its first two decades, the plane flew almost 80 emergency missions — an average of roughly four a year. In the past five years, however, it has flown an average of just one a year.
In October, hundreds were evacuated — and more than 50 were treated at hospitals — when a 5,500-gallon industrial tank in Toledo leaked glycidyl methacrylate, a chemical used in making plastics that is a likely carcinogen suspected of causing genetic defects. It was one of at least 80 chemical emergencies this year that the plane did not respond to.
The decline comes as accidental chemical releases are becoming more common. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board tracked 133 last year, up from 83 in 2021. The Trump administration, meanwhile, is proposing to roll back federal safeguards designed to prevent chemical disasters, including requirements for some plants to undergo independent safety audits and provide hazard information to nearby communities.

Former ASPECT program managers said they used to actively track chemical emergencies and urge EPA on-scene coordinators — who manage environmental emergencies — to deploy the plane. After they left, that proactive approach vanished: The plane stayed in a Texas hangar until coordinators requested it, they said.
Scott Smith, an independent environmental tester who’s often called on by local communities to investigate chemical contamination after industrial accidents, said ASPECT could help him target his soil and water testing by mapping the path of chemical plumes. Deployed regularly, he said, the plane could save lives.
Instead, “It's being shut down and not used.”
A missed opportunity in East Palestine
On Feb. 3, 2023, a Norfolk Southern freight train carrying the carcinogen vinyl chloride and other hazardous chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, near the Pennsylvania border.
As fires from the derailment smoldered, emergency responders feared an explosion — and made the controversial decision to vent and burn five railcars containing vinyl chloride, sending a towering plume over the town.

ASPECT missed the vent-and-burn operation, and its services weren’t requested until more than two days after the initial disaster. Even then, it was used sparingly. Despite the derailment being one of the nation’s worst chemical disasters in years, Kroutil said, the plane collected just eight minutes of chemical data when it finally flew over East Palestine on February 7 — a fraction of what it typically gathered during an emergency.
Had the plane been deployed earlier — or flown over the site en route to Pittsburgh, the nearest major airport — its thermal detection equipment might have helped determine that the tank cars were not in danger of exploding, Kroutil later said in an affidavit.
The National Transportation Safety Board later concluded the vent-and-burn operation had been unnecessary. It found no evidence of the dangerous chemical reaction that Norfolk Southern and its contractors said threatened an explosion. Temperature readings showed the railcars were cooling.

An EPA Inspector General investigation later found a series of errors in the East Palestine response: The agency had poorly documented its procedures and failed to adequately inform emergency responders of the plane’s capabilities. The on-scene coordinator, who didn’t request the plane until two days after the derailment, wrongly believed ground-level monitoring would provide better data.
Frustrated by how EPA officials were running the program, Kroutil retired. Two of his colleagues also left, further draining the program’s pool of experience and expertise.
Then came Smitty’s.
‘It was raining oil’
On Aug. 22, 2025, a massive explosion ripped through Smitty’s Supply, a facility that blended and packaged oil and other engine lubricants in Roseland, La.
Less than four miles away, Ronnie Polezcek and his family heard something hitting their roof that afternoon. At first, they thought it was raindrops.
But when they walked outside, Polezcek said, “It was just like it was raining oil.”
The dark residue covered the family’s 23-acre farm. Polezcek said he had to burn his hay, move his cows temporarily to Mississippi and replace a metal roof that could not be scrubbed clean. Two of his cows miscarried soon afterward, he said, and a veterinarian found arsenic in one of them. Polezcek sued Smitty’s in September 2025. The lawsuit has been consolidated with an ongoing class-action case.

The Smitty’s fire burned for nearly two weeks, sending a huge plume of smoke into the air. Local authorities ordered a one-mile evacuation around the plant, and the EPA dispatched ASPECT — the plane’s first emergency deployment in 19 months.
The agency didn’t publicly post findings from the ASPECT flights until August 31, nine days after the fire began. Those reports show the air around Smitty’s contained ozone and three other pollutants — but at levels considered safe.
A later analysis of the raw flight data, though, told a very different story.
Working with the Government Accountability Project, a nonprofit that advocates for whistleblowers, Kroutil obtained data from ASPECT’s third flight over the disaster area. He said it took him weeks to analyze it, doing by hand what the plane’s software was designed to do in minutes.
Kroutil identified high concentrations of the neurotoxicant toluene and the carcinogens trichloroethylene and naphthalene, among other toxic chemicals. He concluded that the levels of toluene were so high they could have put nearby communities at risk.
Many of the findings also matched what Smith, the independent environmental tester, detected in soil and water after the fire. The EPA later acknowledged a similar problem, according to records that the Government Accountability Project obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request.
In a May 2026 email, an EPA manager said some target chemicals might have been present in data from the third flight but weren't flagged at the time the data was collected. The manager suggested that deterioration of the aging sensors might have contributed to the failure.
More than a year later, Polezcek said, the residue still coats much of his property. When his grandchildren play outside, he said, they come back inside with “little black feet.”
“That’s my biggest concern,” he told Floodlight. “What is it doing to them?”
Polezcek believes officials should have evacuated a larger area.
“I really think it was a pitiful job,” he said. “They just kept saying, ‘There’s nothing to worry about, you’re good to go.’ ”
The wrong fix?
In June, the EPA Inspector General confirmed that Kroutil’s warnings were justified: The plane could no longer provide chemical-monitoring data within five minutes.
Instead, scientists had to conduct manual analysis that would take about a week. The EPA also failed to tell on-scene coordinators that the program isn’t working as designed.

EPA officials blamed the delays on old sensors. The agency bypassed competitive bidding to award a Canadian company, Telops, a $1.7 million contract for replacement sensors designed for several applications, including gas detection and mineral mapping. Integrating the new sensors won’t be complete until “early to mid-2027,” according to the EPA.
In contract documents, the EPA cited peer-reviewed studies showing the Telops sensors had been field-tested and proven. But much of the research on the new equipment has focused on tracking methane leaks, not the wide range of toxic chemicals released during complex industrial emergencies.
Five people formerly involved with ASPECT have raised concerns that the new sensors will be less capable than the old ones at detecting hazardous chemicals during industrial emergencies.
Exosens, the parent company of Telops, told Floodlight that its system and the old one use “different measurement architectures.”
The new sensors, it says, can identify hundreds of chemicals and distinguish chemical plumes from surrounding objects.
Chris Manning, an infrared spectrometer expert with no ties to Telops, the EPA or the firm where Thomas now works, said the new Telops sensors could complement ASPECT’s older sensors but would be a poor replacement. They are slower, less sensitive, and less suited to moving targets, he said.
“To say, ‘We're just going to replace these other two instruments’ ... I mean, that’s ludicrous,” he said.
The old sensors had problems, too. Their artificial intelligence software had not been retrained after an electrical malfunction several years ago, Kroutil and Thomas said. In early 2023, contract scientists with the program presented the EPA with a plan to retrain the software, emails show. But the EPA never took the required steps, Kroutil said.
He and his former colleagues said they have no confidence that the new sensors will fix the problem. They expect the program to deteriorate further.
In the affidavit submitted to the Government Accountability Project, Kroutil offered a dim prognosis: “Unless major changes are made at EPA and with the ASPECT program, it is not going to get any better and EPA will be flying blind.”